"Starting a Conversation about Evolution"
by Phillip E. Johnson
A review of
The Battle of Beginnings:
Why Neither Side is Winning the Creation-Evolution Debate
by Del Ratzsch
Del Ratzsch, professor of philosophy of science at Calvin College, has written
a flawed but thoughtful book that encourages me to hope that, despite some
unfortunate resentments and misunderstandings, the Christian intellectual
response to evolutionary naturalism may be converging on a common set of
principles. I am afraid that many readers may miss Ratzsch's most significant
points, however, because they are presented in a context that tends to conceal
It appears that Ratzsch started out to write a critical analysis of the
conflict between neo-Darwinism and creation- science -- as exemplified on
the one hand by the British zoologist and fervent atheist Richard Dawkins,
and on the other hand by the young-earth fundamentalist Henry Morris and
his creation-science movement. Ratzsch's original aim seems to have been
to show that some bad arguments have been made by both sides in this polarized
conflict, and then to defend the compromise position called "theistic
evolution" from the charge that it is no more than a vacuous attempt
to split the difference between theism and naturalism. That doesn't sound
very new or exciting, but somewhere along the way Ratzsch seems to have
recognized that the old creation/evolution debate is getting redefined,
and he makes some constructive points to help that process along.
Ratzsch's subtitle says that "neither side is winning" the battle
between the neo-Darwinists and the Biblical creationists. I cannot imagine
what gives him that impression, since the Darwinian position dominates not
only science, but government, the universities, the public schools, and
the media. Most people I meet in the secular university world have gained
what little information they have about creationism from the writings of
its principal enemies, such as Carl Sagan, Stephen Jay Gould, and Isaac
Asimov. They take for granted that evolutionary science has explained or
soon will have explained the entire history of life on naturalistic principles.
To the extent that they take any notice of either creation-science or theistic
evolution, they consign both to the subjective realm of "religion,"
which has nothing to do with an objective science like biology.
Given this state of affairs, it is difficult to see what Ratzsch could expect
to accomplish by his concluding recommendation that "maybe the various sides [to the creation/evolution debate] should
talk. Not debate--talk. It is just possible, neither side being omniscient,
that both sides could gain something from serious contact with competent
practicioners on the other."
If Ratzsch is proposing a serious, mutually respectful conversation between
the neo-Darwinists and the Biblical creationists, he is in need of a reality
check. The position of just about everyone with any influence in evolutionary
science is that creationism is not science, and its practicioners by definition
cannot be competent. This is the case not only because creationists are
deemed to be prejudiced by their belief that the Bible has authority over
scientific questions, but even more fundamentally because they reject naturalism,
which is the philosophical basis of contemporary science.
Theistic evolutionists fare little better. Most theistic evolutionists do
not challenge either the conclusions of evolutionary biology or its naturalistic
methodology, but argue merely that evolution by natural processes is compatible
with theistic religion. To the extent that they go farther, and postulate
a supernatural directing force in evolution, they violate the rules of methodological
naturalism and are no more welcome in scientific discussions than outright
creationists. In either case, what scientific topic is there to talk about?
For a productive scientific conversation to be even conceivable there would
have to be a new force in the picture, one which is capable of entering
the debate with arguments which the naturalists cannot easily refuse to
take seriously. Almost halfway through his book Ratzsch discloses that a
potential force of that kind has in fact emerged, a new phenomenon which
he mysteriously refers to as an "upper tier" of creationists.
He explains that this group consists of persons with doctorates from first-class
universities, who are performing serious scientific and philosophical work
to advance concepts like "intelligent design" and "irreducible
complexity" as legitimate descriptions of biological reality. Although
Ratzsch does not name any of the members of this "upper tier"
in his text (a few references are provided in the Notes), or discuss their
work in any detail, he apparently sympathizes with their objectives and
endorses some important principles that are essential to gain them a fair
In particular, Ratzsch rejects the argument that science is defined by its
adherence to naturalism, pointing out that such a dogmatic standard potentially
conflicts with the principle that science should be a "no holds barred"
search for truth. Unless we have a priori knowledge that naturalism
is true, then we cannot rule out the possibility that supernatural action
may have affected the history of life, and that evidence of that action
may exist. Ratzsch similarly rejects Richard Dawkins' argument that reference
to a creator in science as the source of biological complexity is logically
pernicious because it leaves the creator unexplained. Every explanation
has an unexplained starting point. A theistic science starts with an uncreated
creator; a naturalistic science starts with something like particles and
natural laws, and goes on from there. If living organisms -- up to
and including human minds -- can be created by unintelligent material processes,
then the need for a creator (at least after the ultimate beginning) is greatly
lessened if not eliminated. But the "if" that begins that sentence
can be satisfied only by evidence, not by defining "science" to
exclude any other possibility.
On similar grounds Ratzsch rejects the argument, frequently made by theistic
evolutionists, that to posit action by a creator anywhere in the history
of life is to invoke a futile "god of the gaps," who will inevitably
be expelled from reality as science advances to fill the gaps with naturalistic
explanations. Ratzsch sensibly retorts that "If there are no gaps in
the fabric of natural explanation, then obviously appeal to divine activity
will get us off track. On the other hand, if there are such gaps, refusing
in principle to recognize them will equally get us off the track."
That is particularly cogent reasoning if the so- called "gaps"
involve not minor details but such fundamental problems as accounting for
the existence of irreducibly complex genetic information.
In all these instances Ratzsch insists upon a principle I heartily endorse;
he will not permit either side to win its case by controlling the definition
of terms. Either organisms show evidence of design or they do not; either
mindless processes like mutation and selection can make complex biological
organisms or they can not. The determination should be made by a fair assessment
of the evidence and not by defining "science" as an enterprise
that inherently assumes the one possibility and excludes the other.
This endorsement of a level playing field is more radical than readers may
suppose. The view that science and methodological naturalism are inseparable
is widespread among many scientists and philosophers, including theistic
evolutionists, and makes it impossible for them to take seriously the possibility
that the creation of genetic information might require intelligence. Show
them a computer program and they will never question the need for a programmer.
Show them a much more impressive example of design in nature, and they will
never doubt that unintelligent material processes must have been responsible
for the appearance of design. Even if they give lip service to the possibility
that a designer might exist, they will insist on standards of evaluation
that ensure that a putative example of design can never be more than a problem
that naturalistic science has not yet solved.
Ratzsch is aware that the appeal of evolutionary naturalism owes as much
to moral and spiritual factors as to scientific evidence. He says in his
preface that he was raised a Christian fundamentalist, and taught to respect
science but to distrust Darwinism. At first he wanted to reconcile Genesis,
religion, and evolution, but at some point along the way I think I ceased to want them to be reconcilable.
Evolution, along with the new cosmologies and backed by the undentable prestige
of science, became part of a gratifyingly sophisticated excuse for unbelief
-- a ticket out of an oppressive universe with a God who set boundaries
and made demands, into one where we set the rules and the cosmos itself
was the only limit. (It was this personal experience as much as anything
that has convinced me that creation-evolution issues frequently run much
deeper than mere scientific theory.)
I was raised as a nominal Christian, not a fundamentalist, but otherwise
my story would be similar. My own realization that there is a profound relationship
between naturalistic philosophy and Darwinian science led to my writing
two books and many articles on this subject. It also led to my forming a
rewarding colleagueship with a group of scholars and scientists whom I judge
capable of holding their own in a serious conversation with the scientific
naturalists. This group is the "upper tier" of professors and
researchers whose existence Ratzsch so tentatively acknowledges as the new
factor in the debate.
My colleagues and I speak of "theistic realism" -- or sometimes,
"mere creation" --as the defining concept of our movement. This
means that we affirm that God is objectively real as Creator, and that the
reality of God is tangibly recorded in evidence accessible to science, particularly
in biology. We avoid the tangled arguments about how or whether to reconcile
the Biblical account with the present state of scientific knowledge, because
we think these issues can be much more constructively engaged when we have
a scientific picture that is not distorted by naturalistic prejudice. If
life is not simply matter evolving by natural selection, but is something
that had to be designed by a creator who is real, then the nature
of that creator, and the possibility of revelation, will become a matter
of widespread interest among thoughtful people who are currently being taught
that evolutionary science has show God to be a product of the human imagination.
Our movement is something of a scandal in some sections of the Christian
academic world for the same reason that it is exciting: we propose actually
to engage in a serious conversation with the mainstream scientific culture
on fundamental principles, rather than to submit to its demand that naturalism
be conceded as the basis for all scientific discussion. That raises the
alarming possibility, as one of Ratzsch's colleagues put it in criticizing
me, that "the gulf between the academy and the sanctuary will only
grow wider." The bitter feeling that has been spawned in some quarters
by that possibility may explain why Ratzsch discusses our group so tentatively,
but no matter. What matters for the present is to open up the discussion,
and to that end Del Ratzsch has made a positive contribution.
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